Quick answer
Where do MENA Proxies' residential IPs come from?
From home internet connections in each country. We resell residential and mobile IPs from established upstream partner networks. Our upstream provider confirms that device owners opt in and can opt out, and that its supply does not come from seized or disrupted networks such as NetNut or IPIDEA. We do not name our partners publicly, and MENA Proxies has no app, SDK or device network of its own.
Sourcing in brief
| Who supplies the IPs | Established partner networks, names kept private |
|---|---|
| Residential exits | Home connections in the country you target |
| Mobile exits | Carrier connections: a shared rotating pool, plus dedicated modems for ports |
| Own devices, app or SDK | None |
| Countries listed | Those where our partners report supply; live availability is shown in the dashboard |
| Blocked on every plan | Banking, government and payment-portal sites, plus SMTP (email-sending) ports 25, 465 and 587 |
| Abuse contact | [email protected] |
What does our upstream provider confirm?
We resell residential and mobile IPs from established upstream partner networks. Our upstream provider confirms that device owners opt in and can opt out, and that its supply does not come from seized or disrupted networks such as NetNut or IPIDEA.
Those are the two points it confirms. They matter because Google acted against IPIDEA in January 2026 and against NetNut-linked supply in July 2026 (sources below). What a reseller still cannot see is set out in the next section.
What is beyond any reseller's sight?
A reseller sees traffic, not the phones and routers behind it. Four questions therefore stay open, for us as for every other provider that buys supply:
- did each device owner actually understand what they agreed to;
- was an address part of another pool, or of a botnet, before it reached the partner;
- does the partner itself buy some supply from a third party;
- where does each geolocation database place a given address.
Where we can act, we limit harm: sensitive targets are blocked at the gateway, abuse reports are investigated, abusive accounts are suspended, and reports about an address range are passed to the partner that supplies it.
Why does MENA supply rise and fall?
A home IP is available only while its household is online. Small markets have few households: Bahrain counts about 1.6 million people and Qatar about 3 million, so the pool there thins out at night. Iraq switches off the internet nationwide during exam periods, and Lebanese routers drop during power cuts.
For these reasons MENA Proxies shows live availability in the dashboard rather than an IP count, keeps Palestine, Libya and Sudan off the list until partners confirm supply, and charges one price per GB everywhere, so that a plan can move to a neighbouring market when one is thin.
Six questions for any proxy seller
| Ask | What a good answer shows | MENA Proxies |
|---|---|---|
| Is there a written statement on sourcing? | The seller has thought about where its IPs come from | This page |
| How do device owners opt in and out? | Consent, the line between a network and a botnet | Confirmed by our upstream provider: device owners opt in and can opt out |
| What is blocked? | The seller polices its own traffic | Banking, government and payment-portal sites, plus SMTP (email-sending) ports 25, 465 and 587 |
| Where do site owners report abuse? | Problems can be reported and acted on | [email protected] |
| How are IP counts measured? | Figures without a method cannot be checked | No count published; live availability instead |
| Which countries get no page, and why? | Sanctions and local law are taken seriously | Iran, Yemen, Syria: no page and no marketing; the AUP forbids use for sanctioned people or places. See rules by country |
Sourcing: questions
Will you name your partner networks?
Not publicly. Instead we publish what our upstream provider confirms and the limits of what we can check. A company running a compliance review can write to [email protected] with its questions.
Can MENA Proxies promise that no exit was ever in a botnet?
No reseller honestly can. Devices from seized networks can reappear elsewhere, and we cannot look inside the devices behind partner IPs. What we offer is our upstream provider's confirmation on opt-in and on seized networks, blocked targets at the gateway and abuse handling.
Does MENA Proxies use IPIDEA or NetNut supply?
No. Our upstream provider confirms that its supply does not come from seized or disrupted networks such as NetNut or IPIDEA, and to our knowledge neither is a current supplier of MENA Proxies. Because addresses can move between pools after a takedown, we cannot exclude that a given IP once appeared in one.
Sources (2)
- Disrupting the largest residential proxy network — Google Threat Intelligence Group (2026-01-28)
- Google's continued disruption of residential proxy networks — Google Threat Intelligence Group (2026-07-02)